# By thedi agonalization of En we will mea.n the expre

Livre

0

0

6

1 year ago

Preview

Full text

(2) 6 Chapter 1. The General Ide& Behind Gõdel 's Proof H. Thus for any set A of numbers, H expresses A if a.nd only if for every number n: H(n) E T +-+- n E A. Definition. A set A is called ezpressible or nameable in C if A is expressed by some predicate of e. Since there are only denumerably many expressions of C, then there a.re only fini t ely or denumerably many predicates of .C. But by Cantor's well-known t heorem., there are non-denumerably many sets of natural numbers. Therefore, not every set of numbers js ~rpesibl in e. Definition. The system C is called correct if every provable sentence is true and every refutable sentence is false (not true). Thls means that "P is a. subset of T a.nd n is disjoint from T. W e are now interested in sufficient conditions that C , if correct , must contain a true sentence not provable in e. Gõdel Numbering and Diagonalization. We let g be a.1-1 function whlch assigns to each exptession E a naturalnumber g (E) called the Gõdel number of E. The function g will be constan t for the rest of this chapter. [ln the concrete systems to be studied in s ubsequent chapters, a. specific Gôdel numbering will be given. Our present purely abstract treatment, however, applies to an arbitra.ry Gõdel num.bering.) It will be tech.nically convenient to assume that every number is the Gõdel number of a.n expression. [Gõdel's original numbering did not have thls property, but the Gõdel num.bering we will use in subsequent chapters will have this property. However, the Tesults of this chapter can, with :minor mod.ifications, be proved without this restriction (cf. Ex. 5).) A ssum.ing now that every num.ber n is the Gõdel number of a. unique expression, we let En be that expression whose Gõdel n umber is n . Thlls, g(En) = n. By the diagonalization of En we will mea.n the expression En(n). If E.,. is a. predica.te, then its diagonalization is, of course, a sentence; this sentence is true iff the predica.te E,,. is sa.tisfied by i ts own Gõdel number n. (We write " iff" to mean if and only if; we use "+-+" synonymously.] For any n , we let d( n) be the Gõdel number of E,,.(n). The function d(x ) plays a key rôle in aJl that follows; we call it the diagonal function of the system. We use the term number-set to mean set of (natural) numbers. For any number set A, by A* we shall mean the set of ali numbers

(3) I. Abstra.ct Forma of Gõdel's a.nd Tarski's Theorems 7 n such tha.t d( n) E A . Thus for any n, the equiva.lence n E A* ~ d(n) E A holds by definition of A*. [A* could a.lso be written d- 1 (A ), since it is the inverse image of A under the diagonal function d(x).] An Abstract Forlll of Godel's Theorem. We let P be the set oí Gõdel numbers of aJl the prova ble sentences. For any nurober set A, b y its complement Ã, we mea.n the complement of A relative to t he set N of natural numbers-i .e. Ã is t he set of all natural numbers not in A. Theoreni (GT)-After Godel w'ith sbades of Tarski. If the set J5- is expressible in .C and .C is correct, then there is a true sentence of .C not provable in ,C. Proof. Suppose .C is correct a.nd J>· is expressible in ..C. Let H be a pre dica.te that expresses J5• in .C, a.nd let h be the Godel number of H . Let G be the diagonalization of H (i.e. the sen tence H(h)). We will show that G is true but not provable in ..C. Since H expresses P* in .C, then for any number n , It(n) is true +-+ n E P*. Since this equivalence holds for every n, then it holds in partic ular for n the number h. So we take h for n ( and this is the part of the argum.ent called diagonalizing) and we have t he equivalence: H (h) is trtte +-+ h E J5•. Now, h E j5• +-+ d (h) E P +-+ d(h )

(4) Chapter I. The General lde a. Behind Gódel's Proof 8 Conditions G1 and G2, of course, imply that for any set A expressible in C, the set Ã'" is expressible in C . Hence if P is expressible in .C, then so is p• . W e might remark that the verifica.tion of G1 will tum out to be relatively simple; the verification of G2 will be completely trivial; but the verifica.t ion of G3 will turn out to be extremely elab o r a te. Godel Sentences. Woven int o the proof of Theorem GT is a very important principle whlch was made explicit by Rudolf Carnap [1934] and which is closely related to Ta.rski 's t heorem, to which we will soon tum. Call a sentence E,,. a Gõdel sent ence for a num.ber set A if either En is true a.nd its Godel number n lies in A , or E n is false and its Gõdel num.ber lies outside A. Thus, En is a Gõdel sentence for A iff the following condition h olds : En E T +-+ n E A. [Infonnally, a Gõdel sentence for A ca.n be thought of as a sen t ence asserting that its own Gõdel number lies in A. If the sentence is true, then its Gõdel number does lie in A . If the sentence if false , then its G õ del num.ber does not lie in A.] The following lemma and theorem pertains only to the set T. Tbe sets p a.nd n are irrelevant . Lemma (D)- A Diagonal Lemma. (a) For any set A , if A'" is expr essible in .C, then there is a Gõdel sentence fo.r A. (b ) If C satis:fies condition Gi., t hen for any set A expressible in C, there is a Gõdel sen ten ce for A. Proof. (a ) Suppose H is a predicate that expresses A"' in C ; let h be i ts Gõdel number . Then d(h) is t he Gõdel num.ber of H ( h ) . For any number n, H (n) is true - n E A"' , therefore, H (h) is true +-+ h E A•. And h E A'" +--+ d(h) E A. Therefore , H ( h) is true +--+ d(h ) E A, and since d(h) is the Gõdel n umb er oí H(h), then H (h) Js a G õdel sentence for A. ( b ) luunediate from (a) . Let us note t h at if we h ad first proved L emma D , we would have had the following swift proof of Theorem GT: Since P* is nameable in C, then by lemma. D , there is a Gõdel sentence G for P. A Gõdel

(5) I. Abetra.ct Fonns of Gõdel'a a.nd Ta.rski'e Theorems 9 sentence for P is nothing more nor less tha.n a. sentence which is true if and only if it is not pr~vable (in C). And for any correct system C, a Gõdel sentence for P is a sentence which is true but not provable in C. [Such a sentence can be thought of as asserting its own non-provability in C.] An Abstract Forro of Tarski's Theorem. Lemma D has a.nother importan.t consequence: Let T be the set of Gõdel numbers of t he true sentences of C. Then the following theorem holds. Tbeorem (T) (After Tarski). 1. The set T"' is not nameable in e. 2. If condition G 1 holds, then T is not nameable in C. 3. If conditions G 1 and G2 both hold, then the set T is not nameable i n e. Proof. To begin wjth, there cannot possibly be a. Gõdel sentence for the set T because such a sentence would b e true if and only if its Godel number was not t he Godel number of a t rue sente n ce, and this is absurd. 1. If T"' w ere nameable in C, then b_l (a) of L e mma D , there would be a Gõdel sentence for the set T, wbich we have just shown is impossible. Therefore, T"' is not na.meab le in e. 2. Suppose condition G 1 holds . Then if T were nameable in C, the set T* would be nameable in C, violating (1) . 3. If G 2 also holds, then if T were nameable in ,C, then T would also be nameable in e, viola ting ( 2). Remarks. 1. Conclusion ( 3 ) above is sometimes paraphiased: For systems of su:fficient strength, truth w ithin the system. is not definable withjn the system. The phrase "sufficient strength" has b een interpr eted in severa! ways . We would like to point out that conditions G 1 and G2 suffice for t his "sufficient strength. " 2. Gõdel (1931) likens his proof to the fa.mous para.dox o f the C r eta.n who says that a.li Cretans are liars.1 An analogy that comes closer to Gõdel's theorero is this : Im.agine a la.nd in wruch every inhabitant either always tells the truth or always lies. Some of the inhabitants are Atheruans and some are Creta.na. I t is given 1 A c tually, the liar paradox i s more clos.e ly related to Tarsk.i 's thcorem t han to Godel 's.

(6) Cha.pte.r 1. The General ldea Behind Gõdel>s Proof 10 that aJl the Athenians of the land always tell the truth and a.11 the Cretans of the land alwa.ys lie. Wha.t sta.tement could a.n inhabita.nt make th.at would convince you that he alwa.ys tells the truth but tha.t heis not a.n Athenia.n? All he would need to say is: "l aro not an Athenian." A lia.r couldn't make tha.t claim (beca.use alia.ris really not an Athenian ; only truth-tellers are Athenia.n). Therefore, hc must be truthful. Hence his statement was true, which mea.ns tha.t he is rea.lly not an Athenian. So he is a. truth teller but not an Athenia.n. li we think of the Athenians as pla.ying the rôle of the sente.nces of .C, which are not only true but prova.ble in .C, t hen any inha.bitant who clalms he is not Athenia.n plays the rôle of Gõdel's sentence G, which asserts its own non-prova.bility in C. (The Creta.na, of course, pla.y the rôle of the refutable sentences of C, but their function won't emerge till a. bit la.ter.] II. Undecidable Sentences of .C So fa.r , the set n of refutable sentences ha.s pla.yed no rôle. N OW it shall play a. key one. e is called consistent if no sentence is both prova.ble a.nd refuta.ble in (i.e. the sets p and are disjoint) and inconsistent otherwise. The de:finition of consistency refers only to the sets 'P and n, not to the set T . Nevertheless, if C is correct, then it is a.utomatically consistent (beca.use if 'P is a. subset of T and Tis disjoint from n, then P mn.st be disjoint from 'R). The converse is not necessarily true ( we will. la.ter consider some systems that are consistent but not correct). A sentence X is called decidable in C if it is either provable or refutable in C and undecidable in C otherwise. The system C is called complete if every sentence is decidable in C and incomplete if some sentence is undecidable in e. Suppose now J:, satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem GT. Then some sentence G js true but not provable in. C.. Since G is true, it is not refuta.ble in C either (by the a.ssumption of correctness). Hence G is undeddable in C. And so we at once ha.ve e n

(7)